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Is Social Security Secure with NDC?
* 
 
The introduction of NDC public pension scheme in few European countries, such as Latvia, 
Sweden, Italy, and Poland, in the nineties was motivated, among other things, by the need (i) 
to ensure the long term financial sustainability of the public pension system by linking 
pension returns to economic growth; (ii) to reduce the existing distortions in the labor market, 
due to the existing strong incentives to retire early, (iii) to increase the intergenerational 
equity of the system, jeopardized by the different returns across generations; and (iv) to 
reduce the systematic political interference with public pension systems under aging through 
the introduction of a sequence of automatic adjustments in the system that do not require 
government intervention. After more than ten years from their introduction, these systems 
have performed reasonably well on these accounts. However, some degree of political 
involvement with the working of the pension systems has continued (f.e., in Italy), and new 
concerns have emerged. In particular, the combination of a pension system, which strongly 
bases the benefit calculation on previous contributions (and on thus labor market status), and 
the existence in some countries of a dual labor market, with young workers being held on the 
margin of the regular labor market for many years, create a new, potentially strong challenge 
to these systems. Our simulations of the future pension benefits for the current generation of 
young workers with a discontinuous working history in Italy and Sweden suggest that the 
replacement rates will be low, unless the retirement age is significantly increased. This effect 
may end up jeopardizing the political sustainability of these NDC systems in the future, 
unless important labor market reforms are introduced. We discuss the effects on the future 
generation of retirees in Italy and Sweden of a current labor market reform: the introduction of 
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1. Introduction 
The ongoing process of population aging has so far required several adjustments in the public 
PAYG social security systems around the world. And more reforms will follow. In 2000, 
individuals aged 65 years or more represented 14% of the population in the industrialized world 
(Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan), up from 8% in 1950. Yet, the 
proportion of elderly is expected to reach 26% by the year 2050.  Public pension spending has 
increased accordingly. In 2007, the average ratio of pension spending to GDP was 10.2%.  
 
To cope with the financial sustainability of the public pension systems, international institutions, 
academic and policy-makers have largely endorsed a multi-pillar system based on the existence of a 
public first pillar (in some instances to be small and highly redistributive), a mandatory private 
second pillar, and a voluntary private third pillar (see World Bank, 1994).
2  This view has been far-
reaching: several non-OECD countries – mainly in Latin America – have chosen to follow this 
route. But also many European countries have recently reformed their pension systems broadly in 
this direction (Table 1). The initial, main reform aimed at reducing public intervention in the 
pension provision was perhaps the 1986 Social Security Act in the UK, which favored the 
“contracting-out” from the public system
3 into defined contribution (DC) occupational plans or into 
the newly introduced personal pension plans. In the next decade, several countries followed. There 
were also reforms undoing previous reforms that had reduced public pension outlays. This is a clear 
indication of the political economy obstacles to pension reforms. 
 
Table 1. Pension reforms in Europe (15 countries), 1986-2005 
          
 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 2001-05  Total per row 
Increasing generosity  12 9 16 16  53
Decreasing generosity  13 26 29 28  96
Total per column  25 35 45 44  149
       
Source: fRDB-IZA Social Reforms Database (available at www.frdb.org)   
 
The most innovative reforms took place in Latvia, Italy, Poland, and Sweden, with the introduction 
of notional defined contribution (NDC) systems. For instance, in 1995, in Italy the Dini reforms 
transformed the public pension system into a notional defined contribution (NDC) scheme, and 
contemporaneously introduced fiscal incentives for voluntary private pension schemes, which were 
                                                 
2 A recent critical appraisal of this World Bank view is in Barr and Diamond (2008).  
3 The contracting‐out option was already presented since the Social Security Pension Act in 1975.   3
then strengthened in 2004 and again in 2007. In Sweden, the blueprint of the reform to switch to a 
notional defined contribution (NDC) scheme was produced in 1992 by the Parliamentary Working 
Group of Pension. The actual reform was approved by the Parliament in 1994 and its 
implementation began the following year. The switch to a NDC scheme in the public pension 
system was accompanied by the introduction of a small mandatory defined contribution (DC) 
pension scheme, and of (quasi-mandatory) occupational plans, which were intended to compensate 
the reduction in the generosity of the public pensions. The latest European country to adopt an NDC 
system was Poland in 1999. As in the case of Italy, the scheme entirely replaced the previous public 
pension system, but along a lengthy transition process, since only individuals under the age of 50 
were affected. On the contrary, the Latvian NDC scheme was introduced on January 1
st 1996 and 
was immediately effective for all workers. Other countries where NDC public pension schemes 
were introduced include Mongolia and the Kyrgyz Republic. 
 
The basic idea behind a Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) system is to bring a PAYG system, 
in which (defined) contributions from current workers finance pensions to current retirees, to mimic 
a financial account scheme in which workers contribute during their working life and draw 
(defined) benefits after retiring. Unlike financial account schemes, however, contributions to a NDC 
system are not invested in financial assets, and hence the returns on these contributions do not 
depend on stock market or bond returns. The system is notional in that contributions flow to the 
national social security administration, which uses them to cover current pension benefits. The 
returns on these defined contributions are exogenously set, and typically coincide with some long 
term average of the per-capita growth rate of the GDP or of the wages. Once a worker retires, the 
total capitalized value of his/her life-time contributions is transformed into a (typically) real 
annuity: the pension benefit. As discussed in details in section 3, this annuity may depend, among 
other things, on the average life expectancy and on the retirement age. 
 
The introduction of these NDC public pension schemes was motivated, among other things, by the 
need to (i) to ensure the long term financial sustainability of the public pension system by indexing 
pension returns to economic growth; (ii) to reduce the existing distortions in the labor market, due 
to the existing strong incentives to retire early, (iii) to increase the intergenerational equity of the 
system, jeopardized by the different returns across generations; and (iv) to reduce the systematic 
political interference with public pension systems under aging through the introduction of a 
sequence of automatic adjustments in the system that do not require government intervention. 
   4
In fact, despite remaining a PAYG system, the NDC schemes have been used to curb the raise in 
pension spending by indexing its increase to the growth rate of the economy. The defined 
contribution feature of these systems has also been exploited to reduce the pre-existing labor market 
distortions, since additional years of contributions now translate into higher pension benefits. This 
property of NDCs is strengthened by the adoption of transformation coefficients for the conversion 
of the capitalized contributions into a flow of pension benefits that depend on the retirement age. 
NDC systems have also been prized for their supposed higher intergenerational equity, as well as 
for their high degree of insulation from political influence, since most adjustments to their 
calculation coefficients (such as the returns on contributions, and the transformation coefficients) 
can automatically be determined from GDP data and mortality tables.  
 
In brief, NDC schemes have often been proposed as – at least part of – the structural response to the 
ongoing challenges to the public pension systems, such as aging, the growing distortions in the 
labor market, the need to diversify retirement income – particularly in periods of low growth and 
stock market crash, the quest for intergenerational (actuarial) fairness and long-term financial 
sustainability. To some degree, NDCs appear to be the new Conventional Wisdom in pension 
systems. And this perception is further justified by that fact that also Germany recently adopted 
some features in its (point) pension system that mimic some of the NDC key principles (see Boersh-
Supan and Wilke, 2006), and even in France there is discussion about moving in this direction (see 
Legros, 2006; and Holtzman and Palmer, 2005).  
 
After more than ten years from their introduction, we are now in a position to judge the actual 
effectiveness of these systems to perform all the difficult tasks described above. Indeed, on many of 
these desiderata, these NDC systems performed reasonably well. Auerbach & Lee (2009) provide a 
positive assessment of their risk sharing properties (in particular in the case of Sweden), although 
they highlight their costs in terms of low returns on contributions. Retirement age steadily increased 
in the countries that adopted these systems, indeed, as well as in other countries. And most 
international institutions share a rather positive assessment on the future financial sustainability of 
these systems. NDCs are considered to have better properties than non-NDC PAYG systems even 
when these comparisons are carried out across an homogeneous set of countries, as clearly shown in 
the next figure, taken from a 2009 European Commission report.  
   5
 




However, in some countries, notably Italy, a large degree of political involvement with the working 
of the pension systems has remained. After the 1995 Dini reform, which introduced the NDC 
system for private workers, and the Prodi reform in 1997, which extended it to the public sector 
workers, few other reforms have been passed that modified the original, flexible, yet (almost) 
actuarially fair, retirement age, undermining the fundamentals of an NDC system. While the 
increase in the retirement age introduced by some of these reforms may present an element of 
continuity with the previous reforms, the reduction in the flexibility of the retirement system and in 
its reliance on incentives to induce later retirement represents a break with the philosophy of the 
NDC scheme. Moreover, the revision of the conversion coefficient that was due in 2005 to account 
for the increase in the survival probability, and was under the responsibility of the Minister of 
Economics, was repeatedly postponed. 
 
The main contribution of this paper is to analyze the interactions between NDC systems, as those 
introduced in Italy and Sweden, and the recent developments in the labor market of these two 
countries. Our major concern is that the combination of a pension system, explicitly linking pension 
benefits on lifetime contributions (hence labor market status), and the existence in some countries 
of a dual labor market, with young workers being held on the margin of the regular labor market for 
many years, create a new, potentially strong challenge to these pension systems. The current 
generation of young workers will approach retirement age with limited pension rights. Besides 
requiring a large increase in the retirement age, this dualism may jeopardize the political   6
sustainability of these NDC systems in the future, unless important labor market reforms are 
introduced. We simulate the effect of this labor market situation on the future pension benefits of 
current young workers in Italy and Sweden, and discuss the effects on future pensions of a labor 
market reform: the introduction of a unique labor market contract, aimed at reducing the dualism 
between temporary and permanent workers. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section will discuss the political sustainability of PAYG 
pension systems under aging, and will address some specific concerns that arose after the 
introduction of the NDC systems in Italy and Sweden. Section 3 describes the pensions systems and 
labor market dynamics and their interactions in Italy and Sweden. Section 4 presents a simple 
simulation of the pension benefits that current young cohorts of workers may expect to receive 
under different pension systems and different labor market structures in Italy and Sweden. Finally, 
section 5 discusses the future of NDC systems and concludes. 
 
 
2. What are the future challenges? 
 
Over the last three decades, the major challenge to pension systems has been commonly viewed to 
come from population aging. The widespread drop in the fertility rate, and the contemporaneous 
increase in longevity have led to a raise in the share of elderly individuals, who retire to obtain a 
pension benefits, and to a reduction in the share of individuals in working age, which poses serious 
concern for the financial sustainability of any PAYG pension system, including NDC schemes. If 
pension benefits’ calculations were to remain unchanged in the future, the contribution rates used to 
finance the systems should necessarily increase. Alternatively, if contribution rates were to remain 
constant, other reform measures ought to be adopted, such as an increase of the retirement age, a 
reduction of the pension benefits, or a switch in the pension indexation from wages to prices, as 
already implemented in many countries. 
 
However, aging has economic, as well as political effects. To fix ideas, consider the pension system 
as a – potentially redistributive – saving device, which allows individuals to “save” in their working 
years through social security contributions, and to receive the returns from their “savings” in old 
age, as pension benefits. The economic effect of aging is given by the increase in the ratio of 
retirees to workers – the old age dependency ratio. Since the average long run return of a PAYG 
pension system depends on this old age dependency ratio and on the growth rate of productivity,   7
aging reduces the average long-term profitability of the system. As in any portfolio decision, agents 
expecting lower returns from their assets should be induced to substitute their claims towards future 
pensions with more private savings. Therefore, the economic effect of aging should induce a 
reduction in the size of the pension system, since this has become less convenient.  
 
However, as population ages, so does the electorate – and other relevant political players, such as 
the union’s members. The aging process thus leads to an increase in the political representation of 
the elderly – to the appearance of the “gray panthers”, who gather a larger share of votes. Politicians 
seeking re-election will clearly be keen on addressing the needs of this crucial voting group – the 
elderly – with generous welfare policies. Aging will thus have a political effect, consisting in an 
increase of the relevance of pension spending on the political agenda
4. A synthetic measure of the 
political effect of aging is given by the median age among the voters. According to Galasso (2006), 
in 2000, the median age among the voters in a sample of OECD countries ranged between 44 years 
in Spain and 47 years in France and the US. The evolution over time of the median age among 
voters shows a striking expected increase. In 2050, the median age will vary between 53 years – in 
the UK and the US – and 57 years in Spain. Unsurprisingly, Spain and Italy, which undergo the 
most dramatic aging process will, also face the largest change in the median age, respectively 13 
and 11 years. 
 
Concerns about the future financial consequences of the aging process, as well as the short-term 
financial solvency of the pension system led to a sequence of pension reforms in Italy in the early 
90s, which included the introduction of a NDC system in 1995. Similar reforms took place in many 
other European countries, such as France and Germany (see Holtzman and Palmer, 2006). Yet, 
these policy responses to the aging process risk not be conclusive – among other things because the 
aging process has proven more severe than initially forecasted, due to an underestimation of the 
increase in longevity. Table 2 reports the actual share of the population aged 65 years or more in 
several European countries in 1980 and 2007, and their forecast for the year 2020 and 2050 as done 
in 1988 and in 2009. The current aging process is visible in the differences between the first two 
                                                 
4  It  is  worth  noticing  that  the  political  influence  of  the  elderly  is  magnified  by  two  crucial  features.  First,  their 
preferences in terms of economic policies are homogenous. In fact, while young and middle‐aged individuals typically 






columns, which show for instance that between 1980 and 2007 the share of the elderly increased 
from 13.4% to 19.9% in Italy, and from 16.3% to 17.4% in Sweden. The forecasting errors about 
the aging process for the years 2020 and 2050 respectively are presented in the fifth and eighth 
columns. Table 2 shows that in 2009 Italy had to largely modify the previous forecast for the year 
2020, from 19.4% to 22.7%, as well as for the year 2050, from 22.6% to 32.6%. Notice that the 
Swedish forecast for the year 2020 was not to be revised, while further aging was envisaged for the 
2050, from 21.4% to 24.7%. Large forecasting errors for the year 2050 were also made in Greece, 
Germany, Portugal and Spain, and may thus lead to additional pressure for reforming pensions. 
 
Table 2: Actual and forecasted share of elderly (65+) in the population 












AUT  15,5 16,9 19,4 19,4  0  21,7 28,2  6,5 
BEL  14,4 17,1 17,7 19,5  1,8  20,8 25,7  4,9 
DK  14,4 15,3 20,1 20,1  0  23,2 24,5  1,3 
FIN  12  16,5 21,7 22,4  0,7  22,7 26,1  3,4 
FRA  14  16,4 19,5 20,2  0,7  22,3 25,6  3,3 
GER  15,5 19,8 21,7 22,8  1,1  24,5 31,7  7,2 
GRC  13,1 18,6 17,8 21,1  3,3  21,1 31,5  10,4 
IRL  10,7 11,1 12,6 13,3  0,7  18,9 23,7  4,8 
ITA  13,4 19,9 19,4 22,7  3,3  22,6 32,6  10 
NLD  11,5 14,5 18,9 19,8  0,9  22,6 26,6  4 
PRT  10,2 17,3 15,6 20,1  4,5  20,6 30,1  9,5 
ESP  10,9  16,7 17 18,8  1,8  22,9  32,1  9,2 
SWE  16,3 17,4 20,8 20,8  0  21,4 24,7  3,3 
UK  14,9 16 16,3  18,3  2  18,7 23  4,3 
 
Aging, and, in the case of Italy, the deep short term financial unbalance of the pension system, were 
among the reasons that led to the introduction, in some countries, of this new form of pension 
scheme – the notional defined contribution (NDC) systems. After their initial implementation, 
however, additional concerns emerged, as the actual working of these new systems came into play.  
 
The lack of intergenerational fairness in the Italian system is related to two factors. The first is the  
the delay in updating the transformation coefficients, and low frequency at which this adjustment   9
occurs, which create large asymmetries across generations depending on whether they retire before 
or after the adjustment. The second factor, so far more important, is the long transition period, 
which allows individuals with more than 18 (15) years of contribution at the end of 1995 (1992) to 
be shielded from the Dini (Amato) reform. These problems became apparent over the years, as a 
large policy debate took place on these and other aspects of the Dini reform. Analogously, some 
concerns emerged on the role of the so called “vintage pensions”. In fact, since pension benefits are 
indexed to prices only (after the 1992 Amato reform), individuals retiring in different years receive 
pension benefits that, in few years time, may largely differ, with the individuals who retired earlier 
(the early vintage) receiving much lower pensions. 
 
In Sweden, where the NDC pension system was introduced more gradually, concerns have instead 
emerged on the role of the financial defined contribution (FDC) system, which accompanied the 
introduction of the NDC scheme. Several studies (see Diamond, 2004) have in fact criticized the 
design of this FDC system that leaves a large degree of freedom to the individuals in the choice of 
their pension funds, but entails large administrative costs.  
 
These concerns have increasingly been addressed in a recent strand of the literature (see 
contributions in Holtzman and Palmer, 2006), and some policy measures have also been adopted to 
cope with some of these shortcomings. The aim of this paper is instead to shed some light on a new 
possible source of instability linked to, albeit not necessarily caused by, these NDC schemes, which 
stems from the current labor market situation of young individuals in some European countries. In a 
nutshell, since NDC systems provide a tight link between past contributions and future pension 
benefits, the recent dual labor market may induce a large negative income effect on the future 
pension benefits of the current young individuals, as this generation may find itself with insufficient 
contributions – and hence low pensions – to retire. To address this issue, the next section 
summarizes the working of the Italian and Swedish NDC pension systems; describes the 
employment situation for the young, and provides some simulations of the pension benefits that 
current generation of young may expect to receive in the future under these NDC systems. 
 
 
3. The Interaction between Pensions Systems and Labor Market 
A Notional Defined Contribution system is a PAYG pension scheme, in which contributions made 
during the working years are treated as if they were accumulated into a pension fund invested in 
assets. Contributions are typically proportional to labor earnings (floors and ceilings on   10
contributions may apply), but they do not go to an actual fund, and thus do not receive a market 
return. They are only notionally accounted as if they were deposited in a fund, and the returns on 
these contributions are determined by law, often being linked to the growth rate of the economy. 
Upon retirement, individuals who contributed to the system mature pension rights on the pension 
wealth accumulated over their working year. This pension wealth is then converted into an annuity 
– the pension benefit – according to a benefit formula. The next equations provide a basic 
representation of how pension benefits are calculated in an NDC pension system (a more 
comprehensive discussion of NDC systems is for instance in Palmer, 2006):  
 




where p is the pension benefit, τ is the contribution rate on the labor earnings (wi), n is the number 
of year of contributions, g is the rate of return on the contributions, γ is the inverse of the conversion 
coefficient, δ is an imputed indexation rate and m is the expected length of retirement. 
  
Equation (1) shows that pension benefits depend on the accumulated pension wealth and on the 
conversion coefficient. The pension wealth is obtained by accumulating every year pension 
contributions, τw, over time, according to a rate of return on contributions g. At retirement, this 
accumulated contributions are converted into a stream of income (the pension benefits) through the 
(inverse of the) conversion coefficient, γ. As shown at equation (2), this coefficient depends on the 
average expected longevity at retirement, and on an indexation rate, δ, that regulates the returns on 
the pension benefits. In some NDC systems, such as in Italy and Sweden (see Gronchi and Nisticò, 
2006), this indexation rate is front loaded, as retirees obtain the average benefit of the (future) 
indexation from the beginning of their retirement period. Finally, notice that the age of retirement 
affects both equations, by modifying the number of working years, n, as well as the length of the 
retirement period, m.  
 
These basic, common features of the NDC system have been adopted in slightly different fashion in 
Italy and Sweden (for a comprehensive comparison of these two pension schemes on these issues, 
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3.1 Pension Systems in Italy and Sweden 
 
After the 1995 reform, the Swedish pension system rests on three pillars: a public notional defined 
contribution (NDC) system; a (smaller) mandatory funded defined contribution scheme (FND) and 
a wide array of (quasi-mandatory) occupational plans, which cover almost the 90% of the 
population (for a detailed description, see Palmer, 2000, Konberg, Palmer and Sunden, 2006). The 
first two schemes are mandatory; individuals contribute 18.5% of their labor income, of which 16% 
goes to the NDC system, while the remaining 2.5% is deposited in an individual account. 
Employees are free to choose their most preferred private fund where to contribute to, and to switch 
among funds. The default option, in absence of an employee’s decision, is the Premium Pension 
Fund. Funds are privatly managed, but they are regulated by a Premium Pension Authority (PPM), 
which collects the contributions and negotiates the fee with pensions company. In practice the fund 
manager has just the PPM as client, which keeps account for all individual participants to the fund
5 
(see Tapia and Yermo, 2007). The quasi mandatory occupational plans stem from the agreements 
between employers associations and trade unions. The  membership is compulsory for all the 
eligible employees of an employer covered by the collective agreement, irrespective of whether 
they are trade union member or not. These plans can be defined contribution or defined benefit. 
  
In the Swedish NDC scheme, the rate of return on the contributions, g, is set to be equal to the 
average wage growth rate; while the imputed indexation rate, δ, see eq. 2, is fixed at 1.6%. 
However, if the average wage growth rate differs from 1.6% per year, the pension benefits for that 




where π is the inflation rate. Hence, for wage growth rates below 1.6%, the pension benefits are to 
be reduced. This occurrence took place during the 2008-09 world-wide economic crisis, and led to a 
modification of this pension calculation feature, as the indexation – and thus the possible change in 
pension benefits – was linked to a five-years moving average of the wage growth rate, rather than to 
its annual realization. 
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In Italy, the NDC scheme was introduced in 1995, with the Dini reform that completely redesigned 
the architecture of the Italian social security system. The defined benefit nature of the scheme was 
abandoned in favor of a notional defined contribution scheme. Seniority pensions were eliminated – 
over a long transition period – and additional norms were introduced to complete the harmonization 
process across regimes and to provide fiscal incentives for individuals to invest in the private 
pension funds (for a detailed description, see Franco, 2002, Brugiavini and Galasso, 2004, Gronchi, 
1998, and Gronchi and Aprile, 1998).  
 
With the shift to a notionally defined contribution scheme, the Italian social security system 
remained unfunded – as current retirees’ pensions were financed by current workers’ contributions 
– yet, individuals’ pension benefits became directly linked to their lifetime contributions to the 
system.  Indeed, this contributive aspect is only figurative: it works as if every worker had a 
personal fund where her contributions – corresponding to 33% of her annual earnings – were 
accrued during her working career. These contributions are capitalized at an interest rate, which is 
computed as a five years moving average of the nominal GDP growth. At retirement, the 
accumulated asset value is transformed into an annuity through a conversion coefficient, which 
depends negatively on the expected longevity at retirement and positively on the retirement age. 
The imputed indexation rate, δ, at eq. 2, is fixed at 1.5%. However, unlike in Sweden, even if the 
average wage growth rate differs from 1.5% per year, no change is applied to the pension benefits. 
The application of this NDC scheme has been pro quota for those workers with less than 18 years of 
contributions in 1995; while workers with higher seniority remained under the previous regime.  
The Dini reform has also largely revised the eligibility criteria. Seniority pensions, whose eligibility 
was exclusively based on reaching a minimum contribution period, were abolished. Under the 
private employees’ scheme, the minimum number of years of contribution to be eligible for a 
pension was reduced to 5 years only; however, only individuals aged between 57 and 65 years are 
entitled to a pension. These measures have partially reduced the incentives to retire early, since 
pension benefits depend on retirement age through an actuarial adjustment factor, which is included 
in the pension benefit’s conversion coefficient. 
 
A first comparison between the Italian and the Swedish NDC pension system can be performed by 
showing the conversion coefficients, which summarize how the total capitalized pension wealth is 
converted into a flow of pension benefits. As shown at Figure 2, for a given retirement age, the 
coefficients are lower in Sweden than in Italy, partially in response to a higher expected longevity at   13
retirement among Italian women (21.94 years of expected longevity at age 65 versus 20.88 years for 
65 years old Swedish females).  
 
However, Italian pensioners, unlike Swedes, are completely insulated from the underlying labor 
market conditions. After retiring, pensions are kept constant in real terms, independently of wage 
growth. This is the source of the “vintage pensions” issue discussed above.  
 
Figure 2: Transformation Coefficients in the Italian and Swedish Pension System 
 
 
3.2 Dual Labor Market in Italy and Sweden 
 
As a result of many asymmetric reforms, introducing flexibility in the labor market only “at the 
margin”, that is, for new hires, labor markets in countries with strict provisions for regular 
contracts, like Italy and Sweden, experienced a large increase in the share of fixed-term contracts in 
total dependent employment rapidly approaching two-digit levels from scratch. Figure 3 provides a 
graphical representation of this phenomenon by showing the share of temporary workers and the 
unemployment rate by age group for the young generations in Italy and Sweden. 
 
This dualism also involves a significant wage discount for temporary contracts. This discount is 
imposed due to the stronger bargaining power of regular workers vis-à-vis workers with flexible   14
contracts and to the lower outside option of the latter. It takes into account that, due to eligibility 
rules to unemployment insurance requiring some minimum contributory record, most workers with 
flexible contracts do not have access to unemployment benefits in case of job loss. Estimates from 
micro-data (from the EU-SILC) of the coefficient of a dummy variable capturing permanent 
contracts, in a (monthly) wage regression carried out over male dependent employment, controlling 
for education, tenure and the (broad) sector of affiliation, point to a discount of the order of 25 % in 
Italy and even 40 % in Sweden (where there are unfortunately less observations on temporary 
employment in EU-SILC, see Boeri, 2010). 
 














This dualism is likely to deeply affect future pension entitlements of the youngsters. This is because 
(i) workers with temporary contracts earn, ceteris paribus, less than workers on open-ended 
contracts; (ii) they experience more frequent career breaks due to the fact that job shedding is 
concentrated on temporary contracts (as clearly indicated by the Great Recession), and (iii) during 
unemployment spells, they are generally not covered by unemployment insurance.  
 
This problem of adequacy is directly not related to the design of the NDC itself, but rather to the 
dualism of labor markets. Thus, solutions should be found by addressing directly this problem and 
reducing the dualism of labor markets. A politically feasible strategy that has been proposed for 
France, Italy and Spain (Bentolila, Boeri, and Cahuc, 2010) and could also be tailored to Sweden is 
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should gradually increase with tenure length. In particular, Governments could promote entrance 
into the permanent labor market in stages, making job security provisions, in the form of mandated 
severance payments, increasing steadily as workers acquire tenure without large discontinuities.   
 
To give a few examples, in Italy permanent contract holders are protected from the start by norms 
forcing employers to reinstate the worker in the firm in case of unfair dismissals, in addition to 
paying to them a statutory severance pay. In France, when the worker reaches two years in a 
permanent contract, the employer must provide a personalized plan to help the employee to find 
another job. In Spain, economic dismissals from permanent contracts require an administrative 
approval. Employers typically avoid going to Court by paying upfront the worker.  These costs can 
be as high as 36 months of salary in Italy. 
 
A graded tenure scheme could involve in all of these cases a statutory severance payment increasing 
steadily with tenure length (e.g., 5 days of severance per quarter) up to reaching gradually the 
maximum level currently envisaged by national regulations. This reduces the uncertainty of firms as 
to the costs of dismissals, reducing the costs of employment protection for employers. At the same 
time, it allows flexibility to be preserved without creating a dual labor market structure.  
 
 
4 Simulating Future Pension Treatments in Italy and Sweden 
 
To analyze how the current dualism in the labor market of many European countries may interact 
with the existence of an NDC pension system, which strongly ties pension benefits to previous 
contributions, we calculate the expected future pension benefits for two classes of current young 
individuals in Italy and Sweden. To highlight our concern about the long term effect that 
discontinuous working careers have on future pension benefits, we consider the situation (case A) 
of a (male) individual with a career pattern characterized by a sequence of temporary and 
permanent jobs and unemployment spells. We compare it to (case B) a (male) individual, who 
enjoys a uninterrupted career with permanent jobs only, but enters the labor market with the same 
wage as a temporary worker in case A; and to (case C) a (male) individual, who also enjoys a 
uninterrupted career with permanent jobs only, and enters the labor market with an initial wage that 
is 25% higher than in the previous cases (see Boeri, 2010). In particular, case A describes the labor 
market situation of a (male) individual who enters the labor market at age 25 and holds a temporary 
job until age 28; he then remains unemployed until he turns 29, when he finds a fixed term job,   16
which he holds until he is 32, when he becomes unemployed again for one year. At age 33, he 
obtains a fixed term job, which he holds for two years, until he finally gets a permanent job until 
retirement. In cases B and C, a (male) individual has instead permanent jobs from his entry in the 
labor market at age 25 till retirement.  
 
While the former case (A) is more typical of the Italian than of the Swedish labor market, we 
choose to calculate the expected pension benefits for cases A and B in both countries – and hence 
systems, in order to be able to compare the results. In both countries, our two representative young 
individuals will thus have the working careers described above. However, the entry wage will 
clearly differ between the two countries; individuals will also face different contribution rates – 
33% in Italy and 16% plus an additional 2.5% in Sweden, and different retirement age – 60, 65 and 
67 years in Italy and 65, 67 and 70 in Sweden. Also the expected growth rate of the economy (and 
of the wages), which was shown in the previous section to be crucial for the pension benefits 
calculations will differ across countries, being between 1% and 1.5% in Italy, and between 1.5% 
and 2% in Sweden. For Italy, where the labor market dualism is more pronounced, we also provide 
simulations for case C. 
 
4.1 Simulating the Italian labor market and pension system 
 
To simulate the effect of the Italian dual labor market on the future pension benefits of the current 
young generations, we consider three representative young individuals respectively with a 
discontinuous (case A) and a continuous (cases B and C) working career. We concentrate on male 
individuals, with upper secondary education. Their wage profile is calculated using European 
Commission Household Panel data obtained by pooling the 1994-2001 waves. The labor market 
prospects for our representative young Italian male entering the labor market at age 25 and featuring 
a discontinuous career are shown at Figure 4. In his initial temporary job, he earns a monthly wage 
of €800 (in 2001 prices), which remains relatively constant until age 35, when he obtains a 
permanent job. At this point, his wage growth becomes steeper, and his monthly wage reaches 






What pension benefit will this individual, who cannot rely on the beneficial compounding 
capitalization on the very early contributions, due to his discontinuous working career, get? The 
answer is at Table 3, which provides the monthly pension benefit, and the pension replacement rate 
(namely, the ratio between the pension benefit and the average wage in the five years prior to 
retirement) for three different retirement ages (60, 65 and 67 years) and for three (optimistic) 
projections of the growth rate of the Italian GDP (1%, 1.2% and 1.5%). The results show some 
variation. If the current representative young individual will retire as early as at 60 years (that is, on 
average at the same age as his parents), his monthly pension benefit will range between €638 and 
€690, depending on the average growth rate of the economy during his working life, with a 
replacement rate fluctuating around 50%. In absence of additional old age resource, such as 
individual savings or private pension funds, our representative individual will thus be induced by 
the low pension benefit to postpone retirement (see also the simulation in Galasso, 2008). Retiring 
at 65 will allow him to reach a pension benefits of €910-996, depending on the realized economic 
growth – thereby replacing around 70% of his wage income. Only when retiring at 67 years, our 
representative (current) young will be able to obtain a more sizable pension benefit ranging between 
€953 and €1052.  
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Table 3: Monthly Pension Benefit 




















67  0.0562  1052  79%  1342  84%  1677  84% 
65  0.0562  996  75%  1273  79%  1591  79%  1.5% 
60  0.04798  690  53%  889  57%  1112  57% 
67  0.0562  1015  76%  1261  79%  1576  79% 
65  0.0562  943  71%  1202  75%  1502  75%  1.2% 
60  0.04798  658  50%  846  54%  1058  54% 
67  0.0562  953  71%  1210  75%  1513  75% 
65  0.0562  910  68%  1157  72%  1446  72%  1.0% 
60  0.04798  638  49%  819  52%  1023  52% 





To appreciate the magnitude of the effect of a dual labor market on the future pension benefits of 
the current young generations, let us consider the representative young (male) individual, who 
enjoys instead a continuous working career (case B). This individual enters the labor market at age 
25 with a permanent job and the same monthly wage as in case A, that is, €800 (in 2001 prices), 
which however grows constantly over time, until reaching €1600 at the end of his working life, as 
shown at Figure 4.  
 
It is worth noticing that, if compared to the previous individual (case A), his final wage is almost 
€300 higher, due to the progressive increase enjoyed during the permanent job tenure. Moreover, 
the representative individual with a continuous working career will also feature early career 
contributions and will hence have better prospects for his pension benefits. Table 3 (case B) shows 
his monthly pension benefits and pension replacement rates for three different retirement ages (60, 
65 and 67 years) and three projections of the growth rate of the Italian GDP. Also in this case, the 
results show some variation, but pension benefits and replacement rate are consistently more 
generous than in the previous case. If the current representative young individual retires early (at 60 
years), his monthly pension benefit will range between €819 and €889, depending on the average 
growth rate of the economy during his working life. These monthly benefits are almost €200 larger   19
than the benefit received by the individual with a discontinuous working career – that is, almost a 
third of pension benefit higher! Retiring at 65 allows our second representative individual to enjoy a 
benefit of €1157-1273, depending on the realized economic growth – and thereby replacing around 
75% of his wage income. Finally, by retiring at 67 years, he will obtain a pension benefit ranging 
between €1210 and €1342, with a replacement rate between 75% and 84%.   
 
Finally, we consider the situation of a male individual who enters the labor market with a 
permanent contract, and enjoys a 25% higher initial wage (case C). His earning profile, as described 
at figure 5, widely differs from the previous cases, as this worker’s wage starts from €1000 to reach 
almost €2000 by the end of his working career. Pension benefits differ accordingly. When retiring 
as early as at age 60, he still enjoys a pension benefit between €1023 and €1112, depending on the 
growth rate, although the replacement rates are around 55%. Postponing the retirement age to 67 





The dual labor market is known to have a strong, negative effect of the current young generation, 
these simulations suggest that it will continue to take its toll even in the long run, as pension 
benefits and replacement rates will be much lower than today. To see to what extent this negative 
impact can be imputed to the existence of an NDC system, which provides a tight link between 
(early) contributions and pension benefits, we simulated the pension benefits that two of our   20
representative young individuals – respectively with a discontinuous (case A) and with a continuous 
working career (case B) – would have received with the old defined benefit (DB) system, which 
was in place in Italy prior to the Dini reform. Table 4 presents the results in terms of pension 
benefits and replacement rates for both individuals and two retirement ages – 60 and 65 years. Also 
in this case, the difference in pension benefits stemming from the different working careers are 
substantial. When retiring early (at 60 years), a current young with a continuous working history 
would have received €1117, amounting to €243 more a month than an individual with a 
discontinuous career, although the replacement rates would be comparable (72% versus 67%). The 
absolute difference in the pension benefits remains also when individuals retire later (at 65 years), 
but now current young affected by the dual labor market (case A) could nevertheless count on a 
pension benefits of €1034. 
 
Table 4 Defined Benefit System 
   Retributive System 











65  77%  1034  80%  1274 
60  67%  874  72%  1117 
 
 
These simple simulations thus suggest that the troubles lying ahead for the NDC system in Italy 
may not be due to some intrinsic feature of the system, but rather from its interaction with the dual 
labor market characteristic that is currently present in Italy. In fact, particularly in some positive 
instances, that is, for high economic growth and late retirement, the NDC system seems more 
sensitive to the lack of early career contributions than the previous defined benefit pension system, 
since pension benefits are simulated to drop more in the former system for the individuals with a 
discontinuous career. However, NDC systems are also better equipped to allow individuals to 
compensate the effects of these labor market distortions later in life. In fact, postponing retirement 
age is shown to be more beneficial in increasing pension benefits in the NDC system than in the 
previous DB scheme. 
 
These simulations seem thus to support a double handed policy that tries to reduce the dualism of 
labor markets, for instance by allowing for graded employment security, as discussed in section 3.2 
(see also Bentolila, Boeri, and Cahuc, 2010), while at the same time postponing the retirement age.   21
In our simulations, when coupled with an average growth rate of the economy of 1.5%, this strategy 
would have led to a monthly pension benefit of almost €1350 for our representative, middle-
educated male individual. 
 
 
4.2 Simulating the Swedish labor market and pension system 
 
In this section, we replicate our previous simulations for the Swedish pension system and labor 
market. We consider two representative young males, with upper secondary education, and 
respectively a discontinuous (case A) and a continuous (case B) working career, but the same entry 
wage. Their wage profile is calculated using data from the 1997 and 2001 waves of the European 
Commission Household Panel. We use the same labor market prospects as in section 4.1 for Italy. 
Our representative individual with a discontinuous career enters the labor market at age 25 with a 
temporary job that holds until age 28; he is unemployed from 28 to 29, when he obtains a fixed term 
job. At 32, he is unemployed again for a year, then holds a fixed term job for two years, and finally 
a permanent job until retirement. However, the Swedish representative young individual enters the 
labor market with a higher monthly wage, namely, almost €900 (in 2001 prices). Again, this wage 
remains relatively flat until age 35; then our young male obtains a permanent job, and his wage 
growth becomes steeper, till reaching more than €1700 at the end of his working life






                                                 
6  Here, we consider a retirement age up to 70 years.   22
Table 5 summarizes the pension benefits of this individual with a discontinuous working career, 
who cannot enjoy the beneficial compounding capitalization on the early-in-working-life 
contributions. The monthly pension benefit and the pension replacement rate are shown for three 
different retirement ages (65, 67 and 70 years) and two GDP growth rates (1.5% and 2%). Again, 
the range of variation is large. If the current representative young individual will retire early – by 
Swedish standards – that is, at 65 years, his monthly pension benefit will range between €811 and 
€957, depending on the average growth rate of the economy during his working life, thus providing 
a replacement rate around 46%. Retiring later clearly increases the amount of the pension benefits, 
which becomes as a high as €1506, if the individual retires at 70 years, and the average growth rate 
of economy has been 2%.  
 
Table 5: Case A and B 

















65  0.0621  811  47%  1005  48% 
67  0.0678  964  55%  1192  57%  1.5% 
70  0.0784  1249  72%  1541  74% 
65  0.0621  957  46%  1206  48% 
67  0.0678  1147  55%  1444  56%  2.0% 
70  0.0784  1506  71%  1892  72% 
 
To understand the relevance of the effect of a dual labor market we now simulate the future pension 
benefits for the representative young (male) individual, with a continuous working career (case B). 
This individual still enters the labor market at age 25, but with a permanent job and a higher 
monthly wage (around €900 in 2001 prices), which moreover increases constantly over time, until 
reaching €2100 at the end of his working life, as shown at Figure 6. This represents a wage gap of 
almost €400 at the end of the working life, entirely driven by the early experience in the labor 
market. Table 5 displays the associated monthly pension benefits and pension replacement rates for 
three different retirement ages (65, 67 and 70 years) and two GDP growth rates. Clearly, pension 
benefits, albeit not replacement rates, are consistently more generous than in the previous case. If 
the current representative young individual retires early (at 65 years), his monthly pension benefit 
will range between €1005 and €1206, thereby being around €200 larger than the corresponding 
benefits for the individual with a discontinuous working career. Retiring at 70 years busts the 
pension benefits to €1541-€1892 and the replacement rate to 72%-74%.     23
 
Even in Sweden, the dual labor market has thus the potentials to have a strong negative effect on the 
pension benefits of the current young generations. However, the reduction in pension benefits 
driven by (the same) dual labor market seems to be less of a concern in Sweden. This is because 
pension benefits drop by less, albeit on average still by a sizable 25%, due to negative early labor 
market experiences, but mainly because of the extremely large bust that postponing retirement 
seems to have on the pension benefits. For instance, an individual with a discontinuous working 
career retiring at age 70 would obtain a larger pension benefit (€1251 or €1509, depending on the 
average GDP growth rate) than an individual with a continuous working career retiring at age 67 
(€1192 or €1444). 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
The introduction of NDC systems in the 90s has been often advocated as the appropriate reform to 
achieve several crucial objectives, such as the long run financial sustainability of these PAYG 
pension systems and the reduction of the distortions introduced in the labor market. Ten years after 
their introduction, an evaluation of their effects is overall positive. Yet, some aspects of the 
implementation of these systems raise some concerns. For instance, the indexation of pension 
benefits adopted in Italy gives rise to a “vintage pensions” problem, which may be further 
exacerbate by the aging electorate. Analogously, the indexation to wages (rather than the to wage 
bill) in Sweden have proven problematic during big recessions. Careful consideration should be 
made to adopting an indexation mechanism based on deviations in the growth of the wage bill (the 
contribution base) from the potential growth rate of the economy. This indexation scheme would 
also have the advantage of explicitly linking the fate of pensioners to that of current workers, 
reducing the conflict of interests between (young) workers and pensioners and increasing the 
support to growth-friendly policies.  
 
In pension reforms indeed problems typically emerge in the political arena. NDC reforms may not 
prove different from these past experiences, particularly in the near future, when the application of 
the NDC rules in countries that have adopted long transition periods, such as Italy and Poland, will 
lead to the retrenchment of pension benefits. This may provoke the political opposition of future 
generations of elderly having to retire on low pensions. Although NDC have often be designed in 
order for their functioning to be isolated from political interference, some features of NDC schemes,   24
such as the conversion coefficients, may still be open to manipulations by politicians to increase the 
pension generosity. Dual track reform may also be further used to increase the burden on the young 
generations. 
 
This paper has focused on a new challenge to the NDC systems, which may come from the current 
working of the labor market in many European countries. NDC systems provide a tight link 
between contributions and pension benefits. Moreover, due to the compounded effects of the 
interest rates, early contributions have particular relevance for the final accumulated pension 
wealth, and thus for the pension benefits. Unfortunately, in dual labor markets, young individuals 
experience discontinuous working careers, and thus typically fail to accumulate pension 
contributions early in their working lives. Our simulations suggest that this translates into low 
future pension benefits, and in the need to postpone retirement. Young individuals, who are off a 
bad start in the labor market, are also up to a bad finish in the pension system.  
 
A possible solution to this new problem is to adopt a double ended policy. To help the individuals 
early in their working career, a contract that features a graded employment security could be 
introduced (see also Bentolila, Boeri, and Cahuc, 2010) to reduce the dualism of labor markets. But 
later in their working lives, individuals have to be ready to postponing retirement age.  
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